ing more was said upon the subject by the parties. The court held that such silence and permitting the cattle to remain upon the premises constituted an acceptance of the plaintiff's terms. The facts and circumstances in this case seem to practically coincide with those in the instant case except that here the defendant by his reply indicated that he did not propose to be held accountable for the specified sum.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FOREIGN CORPORATIONS—STATE STATUTE FORFEITING LICENSE OF FOREIGN CORPORATION ON REMOVING CASE TO OR INSTITUTING CASE IN FEDERAL COURTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.—A statute of Arkansas provided that, if a foreign corporation licensed to do business in that State should remove a suit to a federal court without the consent of the other party or institute a suit against a citizen in a federal court, the Secretary of State should forthwith revoke such license. The appellee, a corporation of Missouri, instituted an original suit in a federal court in Arkansas and removed a suit to the same court. It then brought a suit against the Secretary of State to enjoin him from revoking its license to transact business in that State. The question arose whether the statute was violative of the Constitution of the United States, as tending to curtail free exercise of the right to resort to the federal courts. *Held*, statute unconstitutional. *Terral* v. *Burke Const. Co.*, 42 Sup. Ct. 188 (1922).

In the opinion by Chief Jusice Taft, the Supreme Court specifically overruled *Doyle* v. *Continental Ins. Co.*, 94 U. S. 535 (1876) and *Security Mutal Life Ins. Co.* v. *Prewitt*, 202 U. S. 246, 6 Ann. Cas. 317 (1906).

It has been long settled that a foreign corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause of the federal constitution. *Paul* v. *Virginia*, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 168 (1868); *Ducat* v. *Chicago*, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 410 (1870). Hence, a corporation created under the laws of one State can transact business in another State only with the consent, express or implied, of the latter. *Lafayette Ins. Co.* v. *French*, 18 How. (U. S.) 404 (1855); *Hooper* v. *California*, 155 U. S. 648 (1895). This consent may be granted upon such terms and conditions as the licensing State may deem expedient, provided these restrictions do not conflict with the Federal Constitution. *Interstate Amusement Co.* v. *Albert*, 239 U. S. 560 (1916); *Phoenix Ins. Co.* v. *McMaster*, 237 U. S. 63 (1915). See Corporations 14a C. J. § 3948, and cases there collected. Also, a State may revoke the license of a foreign corporation, whether for good cause or for no cause, if, in so doing, it does not violate the United States Constitution. *National Council U. A. M.* v. *State Council*, 203 U. S. 151 (1906); *Hammond Packing Co.* v. *Arkansas*, 212 U. S. 322, 343 (1909).

The judicial power of the United States created by Art. III of the Constitution cannot be destroyed, abridged, limited or interfered with, either directly or indirectly, by the several States. *Hess* v. *Reynolds*, 113 U. S. 73, 77 (1885); *Traction Co.* v. *Mining Co.*, 196 U. S. 239, 253 (1905). Therefore, an agreement made by a foreign corporation, as a prerequisite for doing business in a State, that it will not remove suits to the federal courts is void. *Insurance Co.* v. *Morse*, 20 Wall. 445 (1874); *Cable* v. *U. S. Life Ins. Co.*, 191 U. S. 288 (1903). Also, where the license to a foreign corporation was granted upon condition that it stipulate to be subject to the provisions of the act under which it was licensed and one provision

was that, if the corporation removed a suit to the federal courts, its license should be void, the Supreme Court considered that the sole object was the requirement of the stipulation not to remove to the federal courts and held the act unconstitutional. *Barron* v. *Burnside*, 121 U. S. 186 (1887); *Southern Pacific Co.* v. *Denton*, 146 U. S. 202 (1892).

Where the statute provides, as in the instant case, that, if the foreign corporation removes a suit to a federal court or (as set out in some enactments) institutes a suit before such a tribunal, its license shall be revoked, the decisions of the Supreme Court as to its constitutionality have not been uniform. In two instances, the court thought that, as the State had the power to revoke a mere license, the reason by which it was influenced in so doing could not be inquired into, and held the statute constitutional. *Doyle* v. *Continental Ins. Co., supra; Security Mutual Life Ins. Co.* v. *Prewitt, supra.* As stated above, the instant case *in terms* overrules these decisions. In other cases, the court has found no substantial difference between a statute requiring an agreement not to remove (held void in *Insurance Co.* v. *Morse, supra*) and one forfeiting the license of a foreign corporation if it does remove, and so has held such a statute unconstitutional. *Herndon* v. *Chicago, etc., R. Co.*, 218 U. S. 135 (1910); *Harrison* v. *St. Louis, etc., R. Co.*, 232 U. S. 318 (1914) (The statute here provided that, if a foreign corporation asserted in court the existence of foreign domicil or citizenship, its license should be revoked); *Wisconsin* v. *Philadelphia, etc., Co.*, 241 U. S. 329 (1916).

The decision in the instant case seems eminently sound in declaring unconstitutional State statutes enacted for the sole purpose of restraining foreign corporations from invoking their constitutional rights to remove cases to and to institute cases in the federal courts.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—NINETEENTH AMENDMENT.—The Constitution of Maryland limits the suffrage to men. The Nineteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution declares that "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." Under this amendment, which had been ratified by the requisite three-fourths of the States without the assent of Maryland, two women citizens of that State qualified as voters. Appellants brought suit to have their names stricken from the list of voters, alleging that the Nineteenth Amendment was unconstitutional. *Held*, judgment for appellees. *Leser* v. *Garnett*, 42 Sup. Ct. 217 (1922).

Obviously, the extension of the suffrage to the women approximately doubled the number of voters. On behalf of the appellants, it was objected that so large an addition to the electorate of a State, without its assent, destroyed its political autonomy. This was answered by drawing an analogy to the Fifteenth Amendment which prohibited denial of the right to vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." This amendment likewise made extensive additions to the electorate and has been a part of the supreme law of the land for upwards of half a century. See *United States* v. *Reese*, 92 U. S. 214 (1875); *Neal* v. *Delaware*, 103 U. S. 370 (1880); *Guinn* v. *United States*, 238 U. S. 347, L. R. A. 1916A, 1124 (1915); *Myers* v. *Anderson*, 238 U. S. 368 (1915).

The Court rested its decision in the instant case solely on the validity